

to crippled children. Moreover, in order to say that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to commit crippled children over eighteen (18) years of age, it would be necessary to hold that Section 1642 was repealed by implication in so far as crippled children are concerned. Such holdings are not favored and will not be relied upon if there is any other rational method of harmonizing the statute. It must be conceded that Sections 1352-8 et seq. and 1642, are in *pari materia* and must of necessity be construed together. Of course, it is obvious that Section 1352-8 is clearly inconsistent with the general provisions of the statute, in that a commitment "shall be temporary and shall be only for the period necessary for the treatment of such child." However, the other provision of the section relative to the age of jurisdiction is not in conflict with the provisions of Section 1642, *supra*, but is in harmony therewith.

Based upon the foregoing, it is my opinion that the jurisdiction of a juvenile court to commit a crippled child to the Division of Charities is limited by the provisions of Section 1642 of the General Code, and is limited to children under the age of eighteen (18) years.

Respectfully,

JOHN W. BRICKER,  
*Attorney General.*

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1048.

APPROVAL, BONDS OF CLEVELAND HEIGHTS VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO—\$8,000.00.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, July 19, 1933.

*Retirement Board, State Teachers Retirement System, Columbus, Ohio.*

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1049.

APPROVAL, BONDS OF CITY OF CUYAHOGA FALLS, SUMMIT COUNTY, OHIO—\$5,000.00.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, July 19, 1933.

*Retirement Board, State Teachers Retirement System, Columbus, Ohio.*

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1050.

APPROVAL, BONDS OF CLEVELAND HEIGHTS VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO—\$2,000.00.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, July 19, 1933.

*Retirement Board, State Teachers Retirement System, Columbus, Ohio.*