

bury v. Berry, 18 O. S., that "Where the words of a statute are plain, explicit, and unequivocal, a court is not warranted in departing from their obvious meaning, although from considerations arising outside of the language of the statute, it may be convinced that the legislature intended to enact something different from what it did in fact enact." Touching this question, the Supreme Court of this State in the case of State, ex rel., v. Bushnell, 95 O. S., 203, 204, held that "When the meaning of the language employed in a statute is clear, the fact that its application works an inconvenience or accomplishes a result not anticipated or desired should be taken cognizance of by the legislative body, for such consequence can be avoided only by a change of the law itself, which must be made by a legislative enactment and not by judicial construction." Applying these rules of construction in a consideration of the provisions of this section of the General Code as amended by this proviso, I am of the opinion that the second question presented in your communication is to be answered in the negative.

Respectfully,

JOHN W. BRICKER,  
*Attorney General.*

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5138.

APPROVAL—BONDS OF NEW MIAMI VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, BUTLER COUNTY, OHIO, \$113,500.00.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, February 4, 1936.

*Retirement Board, State Teachers Retirement System, Columbus, Ohio.*

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5139.

APPROVAL—BONDS OF PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, \$15,000.00.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, February 4, 1936.

*Retirement Board, State Teachers Retirement System, Columbus, Ohio.*