settle the claim forming the subject matter of the suit, yet such does not appear to have been the intent of the legislature of Ohio, for to give such effect to such language would render superfluous all of the provisions of Section 2416, General Code, with reference to the powers of the board of county commissioners. It is an elemental rule of statutory construction, that courts must give some meaning if possible, to all provisions of the statute, and construe it according to the legislative intent as there expressed. Such legislative intent is to be gathered from all the provisions of the law bearing on the subject matter, and not from isolated passages. *Standard Oil Company* vs. *Surety Co.* 24 O. App. 237.

It would appear to me that the legislature has indicated its intent that the words "to sue and be sued" did not mean also "to compromise and settle," otherwise, when it desired to grant the power to compromise claims to the board of county commissioners it would not have deemed it necessary to enact Section 2416, General Code, to grant such power, and if they were of such opinion it would appear singular that they did not grant similar powers to boards of education and boards of township trustees to compromise claims if it intended to grant such governmental agencies such powers.

Specifically answering your inquiry it is my opinion that boards of township trustees and boards of education do not have the power to settle and compromise claims due to their respective subdivisions similar to that granted to boards of county commissioners by Section 2416, General Code.

Respectfully,

JOHN W. BRICKER,

Attorney General.

1891.

APPROVAL, BONDS OF CITY OF CLEVELAND, CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, $22,000 00.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, NOVEMBER 20, 1933.

Retirement Board, State Teachers Retirement System, Columbus, Ohio.

1892.

APPROVAL, BONDS OF CLEVELAND HEIGHTS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, $12,000.00.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, NOVEMBER 20, 1933.

Retirement Board, State Teachers Retirement System, Columbus, Ohio.