

eighteen years of age, and the opinion held as stated in the Syllabus. However, in said opinion, the Attorney-General stated as follows:

"It appears from the statement of facts presented by you that when the case under consideration was originally disposed of in your court, the youth was placed on probation, committed to the charge of his parents and directed to report to the probation officer. At that time, the court might have, had it seen fit, committed the boy to the Boys' Industrial School, he being under the age of eighteen years, to-wit; fourteen years. This was not done and the Industrial School authorities, therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction over the boy such as would enable them at this time, notwithstanding his having passed the age of 18 years, to receive him as an inmate of the school.

"While under the provisions of section 1643 of the General Code, as amended, quoted above, the delinquent remains a ward of the court for all necessary purposes of discipline and protection until he or she attains the age of twenty-one years, the extent to which the juvenile court may exercise its powers of discipline and protection is necessarily limited by the existing laws, in the case under consideration, to the particular limitation against the commitment of a boy over the age of eighteen years to the Boys' Industrial School."

"Under the provisions of section 1652 of the General Code, as amended, quoted above, the juvenile court is authorized to have returned to him a delinquent who has been placed on probation when it is made apparent to the court that further proceedings are necessary and, until the time when the boy has reached the age of eighteen years, the court would be authorized to commit him to the Boys' Industrial School. Failing to act before that time, however, the Boys' Industrial School would not be open to receive a boy over eighteen years of age."

It is therefore, the opinion of this department that a girl over eighteen years of age may be admitted to the Girls' Industrial School, when the Juvenile Court, prior to her eighteenth birthday, has duly committed her thereto, provided said order of commitment has not been rescinded, or suspended, requiring further order of commitment after said eighteenth birthday.

Respectfully,
C. C. CRABBE,
Attorney-General.

2202.

APPROVAL, CONTRACT BETWEEN STATE OF OHIO AND THE PERMUTIT COMPANY, FOR CONSTRUCTION AND COMPLETION OF WATER SOFTENER EQUIPMENT WITH ELECTRIC ALARM METERS FOR MIAMI UNIVERSITY, OXFORD, OHIO, AT COST OF \$2,910.00. SURETY BOND EXECUTED BY THE NATIONAL SURETY COMPANY.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, February 6, 1925.

HON. L. A. BOULAY, *Director, Department of Highways and Public Works, Columbus, Ohio.*

DEAR SIR:—You have submitted for my approval a contract between the State

of Ohio, acting by the Department of Highways and Public Works, and The Permutit Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware and of New York. This contract covers the construction and completion of water softener equipment with electric alarm meters for Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, and calls for an expenditure of \$2,910.00.

You have submitted the certificate of the Director of Finance to the effect that there are unencumbered balances legally appropriated in a sum sufficient to cover the obligations of the contract. There has further been submitted a contract bond upon which the National Surety Company appears as surety, sufficient to cover the amount of the contract.

You have further submitted evidence indicating that plans were properly prepared and approved, notice to bidders was properly given, bids tabulated as required by law and the contract duly awarded. Also it appears that the laws relating to the status of surety companies and the workmen's compensation have been complied with.

Finding said contract and bond in proper legal form, I have this day noted my approval thereon and return the same herewith to you, together with all other data submitted in this connection.

Respectfully,
C. C. CRABBE,
Attorney-General.

2203.

SEWER DISTRICT—AUTHORITY OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS UNDER
SECTIONS 6602-1a AND 6602-1b GENERAL CODE.

SYLLABUS:

Authority granted under sections 6602-1a and 6602-1b cannot be limited or defined by ordinance or resolution of council in such a manner as to give supervisory powers to the council over the establishment, construction, maintenance, repair and operation of a county sewer district. The board of county commissioners should not regard any limitation or qualification as giving the consent of the municipality to the establishment of the sewer district.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, February 6, 1925.

HON. EDWARD C. STANTON, *Prosecuting Attorney, Cleveland, Ohio.*

DEAR SIR:—I am in receipt of your communication as follows:

“A question has arisen on which your opinion is requested as to whether, under the provisions of section 6602-1a and 6602-1b G. C., as amended 110 Ohio Laws 338, a municipality may by the ordinance or resolution authorizing the board of county commissioners to lay out, establish and maintain one or more sewer districts within the municipality, limit the authority of the board of county commissioners as to what may constitute ‘a main works’ and by such ordinance or resolution provide that no works of any kind, the cost and expense of which will be charged against the property within the municipality until plans and estimates therefor have been prepared and submitted to the council of the municipality and the approval of that body thereto obtained.

“Can any limitation or definition be placed upon such ‘main works’ by the municipality, as for instance, that no water pipes or sewers whatsoever