

the city hospital is a workshop as understood by the ordinary interpretation of the term, it is my opinion that the order referred to is valid under the powers lodged in your commission.

Coming to the second objection, namely, that no reference is made in section 1008 of the General Code, *supra*, to 'city hospitals,' it is to be observed that the order is directed not against the city hospital, as such, but that part of the hospital known as the laundry, which for the purposes of the act in question, by ordinary knowledge, is to be regarded as coming within the terms of 'factory or workshop'."

I agree both with the result and reasoning of the above quoted opinion. It is also clear to my mind that the terms "industry, trade or business" are sufficiently broad, and comprehensive enough, to embrace the laundry departments of hospitals situated in Ohio. Such laundry is in the sense used above a "workshop" and the business of a laundry is carried on therein even though such laundry is only in connection with the particular hospital, is not operated for profit, and does not do laundry work for the public in general. Not only are the terms employed i. e., "industry, trade or business" sufficiently comprehensive to include the laundry departments of a hospital but such construction is also within the purpose of the law which is to protect women and children against "oppressive and unreasonable", or what is aptly called "sweatshop" wages, in return for their services rendered. It can readily be seen that the true reason for such legislation is applicable whether women do laundry work in a commercial or in a hospital laundry. It is stated in *Cochrel vs. Robinson*, 113 O. S., 526, in the fourth branch of the syllabus:

"4. In the construction of a statute the primary duty of the court is to give effect to the intention of the legislature enacting it. Such intention is to be sought in the language employed and the apparent purpose to be subserved and such construction adopted which permits the statutes and its various parts to be construed as a whole and give effect to the paramount object to be obtained."

Specifically answering your inquiry it is my opinion that the Minimum Wage Law, Sections 154-45d to 154-59f, inclusive, General Code, is applicable to the laundry departments of Ohio hospitals.

Respectfully,
JOHN W. BRICKER,
Attorney General.

2922.

APPROVAL--CONTRACT COVERING THE CITY OF NORWOOD, HAMILTON COUNTY, STATE HIGHWAY NO. 10.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, July 13, 1934.

HON. O. W. MERRELL, *Director of Highways, Columbus, Ohio.*

DEAR SIR:—This acknowledges receipt of your letter of recent date submit-

ting for my examination and approval contract covering the following:

County—Hamilton
 City—Norwood
 State Highway—No. 10
 Section—Norwood (Part)

Finding said contract proper as to legality and form, I have endorsed my approval thereon and return the same herewith to you.

Respectfully,

JOHN W. BRICKER,
Attorney General.

2923.

APPROVAL—THREE BONDS FOR THE FAITHFUL PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES AS INVESTIGATORS, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS—EVERETT R. BEETS, JOHN W. BROOKS, ROBERT C. HAUBRICH.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, July 13, 1934.

HON. O. W. MERRELL, *Director of Highways, Columbus, Ohio.*

DEAR SIR:—You have submitted three bonds, each in the penal sum of \$2,000.00, with sureties as indicated, to cover the faithful performance of the duties of the officials as hereinafter named:

Everett R. Beets, Investigator, Department of Highways—New York Casualty Company.

John W. Brooks, Investigator, Department of Highways—New York Casualty Company.

Robert C. Haubrich, Investigator, Department of Highways—New York Casualty Company.

Said bonds have undoubtedly been executed pursuant to the provisions of sections 1182-2 and 1182-3, General Code. Such sections provide, in so far as pertinent, as follows:

“Sec. 1182-2. The director may appoint * * * engineers, inspectors and other employes within the limits of the appropriation as he may deem necessary to fully carry out the provisions of this act * * *.”

“Sec. 1182-3. Each employe or appointee under the provisions of this act, in cases other than where the amount of the bond is herein fixed, may be required to give bond in such sum as the director may determine. All bonds hereinbefore provided for shall be conditioned upon the faithful discharge of the duties of their respective positions, and such bonds * * * shall be approved as to the sufficiency of the sureties